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Abstract
On June 22, 2004, President Bush signed into law perhaps the most signi?cant
amendments to the U.S. antitrust statutes since the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust
Improvements Act of 1976. These changes, enacted as H.R. 1086, will have sub-
stantial implications for several areas of antitrust enforcement. These include:
• limiting potential civil actions against standard-setting organizations;increasing
even further incentives for antitrust wrongdoers to participate in the Antitrust Divi-
sion’s corporate leniency program; increasing criminal penalties for corporations
and individuals; and enhancing judicial scrutiny of antitrust consent decrees.
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On June 22, 2004, President Bush signed into law perhaps the most signiﬁcant amendments to the U.S. antitrust 
statutes since the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust 
Improvements Act of 1976.  These changes, 
enacted as H.R. 1086, will have substantial 
implications for several areas of antitrust en-
forcement.  These include:
• limiting potential civil actions against 
standard-setting organizations;
• increasing even further incentives for 
antitrust wrongdoers to participate in the 
Antitrust Division’s corporate leniency 
program;
• increasing criminal penalties for corpora-
tions and individuals; and
• enhancing judicial scrutiny of antitrust 
consent decrees.
Standards Development Organization 
Advancement Act of 2004
In the United States, private “standard-setting 
organizations” often develop industry technical 
standards that enhance quality and safety and 
reduce costs.   Through the Standards Develop-
ment Organization Advancement Act of 2004, 
Congress has sought to address concerns that the 
threat of treble-damage antitrust actions -- for 
example, by suppliers of equipment that does not 
meet industry standards -- may be chilling the 
development of socially beneﬁcial standards.    
The legislation amends the National Coop-
erative Research and Production Act of 1993 
(NCRPA), 15 U.S.C. § 4301 et seq., to limit the 
potential civil liability of  “Standard Development 
Organizations” (SDO) in certain circumstances. 
The legislation limits awards against SDOs in 
federal or state antitrust suits to actual (rather 
than treble) damages and attorneys’ fees and 
costs, if:
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• the SDO provides the Federal Trade Com-
mission and Attorney General with timely 
written notice disclosing (a) its name and 
principal place of business; and (b) docu-
ments showing the nature and scope of its 
standard-setting activities; and    
 
• the antitrust claim results from conduct 
within the scope of the notiﬁcation.
In addition to the single-damages provision, the 
legislation beneﬁts SDOs by (a) specifying that all 
antitrust claims against them shall be judged under 
the rule of reason; and (b) providing that SDOs 
prevailing in litigation may recover attorneys’ fees 
and costs if the court determines that the claim or 
the plaintiff’s conduct during the litigation “was 
frivolous, unreasonable, without foundation or in 
bad faith.”   
Although the legislation provides some relief 
for SDOs, there are very important limitations 
on its effects.  The legislation explicitly limits 
its relief only to SDOs themselves and their 
full-time employees.  Unlike the NCRPA pro-
visions relating to research and production joint 
ventures, the legislation does nothing to protect 
corporations (or their employees) that participate 
in standard-setting activities.  Given the central 
role that industry participants play in these activi-
ties, this limitation raises questions whether the 
Act will achieve its goal of preventing antitrust 
exposure from chilling beneﬁcial standard set-
ting activities.  
Further, the legislation expressly excludes 
from its protections speciﬁed conduct that falls 
outside the scope of legitimate “standards de-
velopment activity.”  This includes exchanges 
of information among competitors relating to 
“cost, sales, proﬁtability, prices, marketing, or 
distribution” that is not reasonably required to 
develop or assess conformity with standards; 
market allocation agreements; and agreements 
to ﬁx prices.  
Antitrust Criminal Penalty Enhancement 
and Reform Act of 2004
 The bill also included the Antitrust Criminal 
Penalty Enforcement and Reform Act of 2004. 
This Act has important implications for cartels 
and related civil actions; criminal penalties for an-
titrust violations; and the process by which courts 
approve Department of Justice consent decrees.  
 Cartels and Related Civil Actions
Since 1993, the DoJ’s Antitrust Division has 
operated a “Corporate Leniency Program,” under 
which DoJ grants immunity from criminal pros-
ecution to corporations (and their ofﬁcers, direc-
tors, and employees) that are the ﬁrst in the door 
to self-report conduct (usually cartels) that violates 
the antitrust laws.   By creating strong incentives 
for cartel participants to blow the whistle and thus 
destabilize antitrust conspiracies, the leniency 
program has been instrumental in dramatically 
increasing the number of cartels that DoJ has been 
able to prosecute successfully.  
The Antitrust Division was concerned, how-
ever, that the prospect of treble-damage civil law-
suits was dissuading some antitrust wrongdoers 
from participating in the program.  In particular, 
cartel participants had to weigh the beneﬁts of 
immunity from criminal prosecution against the 
strong likelihood of federal and state treble-dam-
age claims based on their admitted wrongdoing. 
Furthermore, leniency program participants might 
ﬁnd themselves liable not only for triple the dam-
ages suffered by customers that they dealt with, 
but also for three-times the damages to their co-
conspirators’ customers under joint and several 
liability rules.  
To address these concerns, the legislation lim-
its the total private civil liability of corporations 
that have entered into leniency agreements with 
the Antitrust Division (combined with that of their 
ofﬁcers, directors, and employees who are covered 
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ously to consider applying for leniency under the 
Corporate Leniency Program to obtain amnesty 
from criminal prosecution.  Given the prospects 
for relief from civil damages and the increased 
criminal penalties (see below) that the legislation 
creates, they now have even greater incentive to 
apply for leniency.
Enhanced Criminal Penalties  
The legislation also dramatically increases po-
tential criminal penalties for violations of Section 
1 of the Sherman Act.  Congress’s stated purpose 
here was to make criminal penalties for antitrust 
offenses more consistent with the harsh -- and 
arguably draconian -- penalties for white collar 
offenses that Sarbanes-Oxley and other recent 
legislation established.  Maximum penalties are 
increased as follows:
• criminal ﬁnes for corporations from $10 
million to $100 million;
• criminal ﬁnes for individuals from $350,000 
to $1 million; and 
• prison sentences from three to ten years.  
Although the legislation itself only increases 
maximum penalties, we expect the U.S. Sentencing 
Commission to increase sentencing guideline rang-
es in accordance with the increased maximums, as 
it did with the Sarbanes-Oxley amendments.  
The Criminal Fines Improvements Act of 1987, 
18 U.S.C. § 3571, already provides that a court 
may impose, as an alternative to the maximum 
ﬁne set forth in the Sherman Act, a ﬁne equal to 
twice the gain or loss caused by the crime.  Ac-
cordingly, at least for ﬁnes against corporations, 
the amendment’s most signiﬁcant effect will be 
to relieve the government of the need to prove the 
gain or loss attributable to an antitrust wrongdoer’s 
conduct in order to obtain a ﬁne over $10 million. 
Although most ﬁnes result from plea agreements, 
the government’s (often difﬁcult) burden of proving 
the amount of gain or loss in a contested case has 
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by the agreement) to actual damages “attributable 
to the commerce done by the applicant in the 
goods or services affected by the violation” (i.e., 
single damages), plus attorneys’ fees, costs, and 
interest.  This limitation applies both to federal 
claims under Section 1 or 3 of the Sherman Act 
and to claims brought under similar state laws. 
(The legislation will cease to have effect in ﬁve 
years unless Congress re-enacts it.)  
Notably, under the legislation, leniency 
program participants are no longer jointly and 
severally liable for damages suffered by their 
co-conspirators’ customers.  The legislation will, 
conversely, increase the potential liability for car-
tel participants that do not obtain leniency because 
they may be jointly and severally liable for two-
times the actual damages suffered by customers 
of the leniency applicant, which that wrongdoer 
has avoided through its cooperation. 
This relief comes at some price to the leni-
ency program participant, however. While pro-
gram participants have always been required to 
cooperate closely with the Antitrust Division, to 
obtain the beneﬁt of reduced damage exposure 
they must also cooperate with private plaintiffs. 
In particular, the trial court must determine that 
the corporation (and any individuals covered by 
the leniency agreement) has provided “satisfac-
tory cooperation to the claimant with respect to 
the civil action.”  The corporation and individuals 
must (a) “provid[e] a full account to the claimant 
of all facts” known to them that “are potentially 
relevant to the civil action” and (b) “furnish[] all 
documents or other items potentially relevant to 
the civil action” in their possession, custody, or 
control “wherever they are located.”  Additionally, 
cooperating individuals must sit for any inter-
views, depositions, or testimony that the plaintiff 
reasonably requests and must respond completely 
and truthfully to all questions the plaintiff asks. 
The corporation must use its best efforts to secure 
and facilitate the cooperation of its personnel.
Companies that have participated in antitrust 
violations have always been well-advised seri-
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always limited its leverage in plea negotiations. 
Now the government will not need to prove the 
amount of gain or loss unless it is seeking a ﬁne 
of over $100 million, which is rarely the case.  As 
a practical matter, this will substantially increase 
the government’s bargaining power in plea negotia-
tions with corporate defendants.      
 The amendments also mean that individuals 
convicted of antitrust offenses are likely to spend 
much more time in jail.  Unfortunately, Congress 
failed to hold any hearings or otherwise undertake 
any reasoned public analysis to determine whether 
current sentences for antitrust offenses have proven 
inadequate to meet goals of deterrence, retribution, 
or incapacitation.  
 Finally, we note that the Supreme Court’s 
decision last week in Blakely v. Washington may 
have important implications for the sentencing of 
both individuals and corporations convicted of 
antitrust violations.  That decision sharply limits 
the factors that a court may take into account in 
sentencing that were not proven to a jury or admit-
ted by the defendant.  It remains to be seen exactly 
how Blakely will affect sentencing in antitrust and 
other areas where courts have traditionally relied 
on facts -- such as the amount of loss resulting from 
the offense -- that were not proven to the jury or 
admitted by the defendant.
Amendments to Tunney Act 
The Tunney Act of 1974, 15 U.S.C. § 16, 
requires that the Department of Justice publish 
for public comment proposed consent judgments, 
and that courts determine whether the proposal is 
“in the public interest” before entering judgment. 
In recent years, however, some have expressed 
concern that the courts have been “rubber stamp-
ing” consent decrees without subjecting them to 
signiﬁcant independent review.  
This concern grew largely out of decisions of 
the D.C. Circuit that construed narrowly the district 
courts’ authority to reject consent decrees.  Most 
prominently, in United States v. Microsoft, 56 F.3d 
1448 (D.C. Cir. 1995), the D.C. Circuit overruled 
the district court’s refusal to enter a consent de-
cree between the United States and Microsoft and 
observed that, unless an antitrust consent decree 
would “make a mockery of the judicial power,” 
the “Tunney Act cannot be interpreted as an au-
thorization for a district judge to assume the role 
of attorney general.”  Id. at 1462. 
With the new legislation, Congress has tried to 
clarify that district courts are to undertake a more 
thorough, independent determination whether a 
proposed consent decree is in the public interest. 
To that effect, Congress made ﬁndings that:
• “[the] purpose of the Tunney Act was to 
ensure that the entry of antitrust consent 
judgments is in the public interest”; and 
• “it would misconstrue the meaning of the 
Congressional intent in enacting the Tunney 
Act to limit the discretion of district courts 
to review antitrust judgments solely to de-
termining whether entry of those consent 
judgments would make a ‘mockery of the 
judicial function.’”   
In addition, Congress changed the Tunney 
Act’s language that the court “may” consider an 
enumerated list of factors in determining whether 
to enter a proposed consent judgment to a com-
mand that the court “shall” consider those factors. 
The factors that courts now must consider, which 
the legislation modiﬁed slightly from the original 
Tunney Act, are: 
(a) the competitive impact of such judgment, 
including termination of alleged violations, 
provisions for enforcement and modiﬁca-
tion, duration or relief sought, anticipated 
effects of alternative remedies actually 
considered, whether its terms are ambigu-
ous, and other competitive considerations 
bearing upon the adequacy of such judg-
ment that the court deems necessary to a 
determination of whether the consent judg-
ment is in the public interest; and 
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(b) the impact of entry of such judgment 
upon competition in the relevant market 
or markets, upon the public generally and 
individuals alleging speciﬁc injury from the 
violations set forth in the complaint includ-
ing consideration of the public beneﬁt, if 
any, to be derived from a determination of 
the issues at trial.
(The new language is italicized.)
It is difﬁcult to predict the extent to which, if 
any, the amendments to the Tunney Act will cause 
courts more often to reject or hold extensive hear-
ings concerning proposed consent decrees.   The 
amendments expressly state that Tunney Act “shall 
not be construed to require the court to conduct an 
evidentiary hearing or to require the court to per-
mit anyone to intervene.”  We believe, however, 
that the amendments will, at the margin, probably 
introduce more uncertainty into the process of ne-
gotiating consent decrees with the Justice Depart-
ment.  They may also create more opportunities for 
parties opposed to consent decrees to receive fuller 
consideration from district courts or perhaps obtain 
concessions from settling parties that wish to avoid 
contested Tunney Act proceedings.
*     *     *    *    *    *    *
The amendments we discuss above all have 
potentially important consequences for businesses 
and individuals affected by the U.S. antitrust laws. 
It will remain to be seen how they change the dy-
namics of antitrust enforcement in practice.     
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